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6.1  Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is twofold: to compare and contrast tradi- 
tional and recent theoretical constructs of horizontal and vertical equity 
through the use of a general, theoretical framework; and to measure the 
horizontal and vertical equity of the federal individual income tax,’ over a 
significant period of time, through the use of large, microdata files of fed- 
eral individual income tax returns, and through the use of certain sum- 
mary index numbers developed earlier by the authors and based on Wertz 
(1  975).  * 
In terms of our major theoretical results, we  find that the traditional 
principle of equity, taken to  mean “equal treatment of equals,” is logically 
separate from the more recent notion of horizontal equity which suggests 
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1. Throughout this study we examine the ratio of net taxes to measured, economic income 
and interpret this ratio to reflect the equity of the tax system. Much of this chapter addresses 
the issue of what equity may be defined to mean. These measures are ex post measures of the 
relationship between individual taxes and their pretax income. It is therefore unnecessary to 
account separately for behavioral responses of taxpayers to tax rules that lead them to  rear- 
range their sources of income and ultimately affect their taxes as well. Because we are exam- 
ining various ex post measures over time, we are able to see if stability exists in the observed 
pattern of  vertical and horizontal equity in the system. A disadvantage with examining just 
one year of data is that the observed, ex post distribution may reflect transitory reactions to a 
particular event. 
2.  See Berliant and Strauss 1983. 
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that the relative positions of  individuals’ before-and after-tax income be 
maintained for horizontal equity to be achieved. While several authors 
have stated that the classical criteria of equals-treated-equally implies this 
no-rank-reversal ~riterion,~  we demonstrate through two simple counter- 
examples that this is not true. Also, we suggest that the analysis of a tax 
system’s equity is inherently a two-variable problem (the economic posi- 
tion of taxpayers without regard to the tax system, and the taxpayers’ ef- 
fective tax rates), rather than a single variable problem (the distribution of 
before- or after-tax income). 
Generally, our framework permits the distinction between measures of 
income inequality, and vertical and horizontal equity. The new notion of 
horizontal equity that requires maintenance of relative rank position may 
be viewed in this framework, according to our nomenclature, to be a verti- 
cal rather than a horizontal equity concept, while inequality measures are 
found to be income distribution concepts. 
In terms of our major empirical results, we find a number of interesting 
regularities in the pattern of horizontal and vertical equity of the U.S. per- 
sonal income tax. Over the period 1966-77 we find that the overall vertical 
progressivity of the federal personal income tax has remained at a high 
level-that  is, comparisons  of pairs of taxpayers in each of the twelve 
years suggests that at least 80 percent of the comparisons are progressive; 
that is, those with higher incomes experienced higher effective tax rates 
than those with lower incomes. By contrast, there is substantial evidence 
of horizontal inequity. Those taxpayers classified as being in the same eco- 
nomic position were found in 80 percent of the comparisons to experience 
different effective tax rates; we interpret this to be evidence of horizontal 
inequity. 
While the level of  progressivity was generally high, evidence indicates 
that it has declined somewhat over the sample period (1966-77). Also, we 
find that the progressivity of the tax system for single taxpayers and mar- 
ried-filing-jointly taxpayers has been declining over the study period. We 
do not, by contrast, find significant trends in horizontal equity over time 
for any subgroups. 
If we characterize the impact of taxation through the use of the Gini co- 
efficient of  after-tax income, an income inequality measure, we  find that 
it is declining over time in a significant fashion generally and for single 
and married-filing-jointly taxpayers.  Thus, the Gini coefficient tells us 
that the  distribution  of  after-tax  income  became more  egalitarian or 
equal, while the vertical and horizontal index numbers indicate that a 
more complex process has been at work, since there has been a decline in 
progressive components in the system and in increase in regressive compo- 
nents in the tax system over the period 1966-77. 
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If we examine the overall level of progressivity and horizontal equity by 
type of filing unit, we find that there are much greater differences among 
these strata, in the extent to which the tax system creates horizontal in- 
equity, in comparison to the differences in the overall level of progres- 
sivity. That is, the tax system tends to be progressive at the same rate, but 
fails to achieve horizontal equity at the same rate for different types of fil- 
ing units. Generally, horizontal equity tends to be greatest for single tax- 
payers and smallest for married-filing-jointly taxpayers. This appears to 
be related to the high degree of itemization among married taxpayers fil- 
ing jointly. 
The body of this chapter is organized as follows: section 6.2 provides a 
general conceptual framework within which various equity concepts may 
be analyzed, and provides a comparison of traditional concepts and meas- 
ures with others in the literature. The intuition behind the index numbers 
developed by the authors is also discussed. Section 6.3 describes the mi- 
crodata files used in the empirical section of the paper, and compares the 
empirical measures of income with notions of  theoretically desired, eco- 
nomic income. Section 6.3 also discusses a number of technical, related is- 
sues of how one implements the index numbers developed in section 6.2. 
Section 6.4 provides the empirical results for our measures of horizontal 
and vertical equity along with those found in the literature. Section 6.5 
concludes. 
6.2  Concepts of Horizontal and Vertical Equity 
6.2.1  A Framework for Analyzing Alternative Concepts of Equity 
We  provide here a discussion of alternative horizontal and vertical equity 
concepts and a rationale for the use of our index numbers, which are rela- 
tively novel. Since the emphasis in this paper is primarily empirical, we 
omit formal proofs of the central propositions here; a more complete 
study is Berliant and Strauss (1984), where proofs of the propositions stated 
below may be found. 
Summary measures of income and other distributions have long inter- 
ested economists and statisticians.  In a number of related papers Atkin- 
son (1970), Blackorby and Donaldson (1976), Sen (1973), Kondor (1975), 
Rosen (1978), Fields and Fei (1978), and King (1983) have pointed out that 
index measures of the income distribution should be consistent with a so- 
cial welfare function. Atkinson (1970), for example, develops on the basis 
of certain characteristics, or postulates concerning an underlying social 
welfare function, a particular index of vertical income inequality, while 
Fields and Fei (1978) examine a number of commonly used index meas- 
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Theil’s index) to see if they are consistent with three axioms that they rec- 
ommend for vertical measures of income ineq~ality.~ 
Related to  the broad area of income distribution has been a literature in 
public finance concerned with the measurement of the progressivity of a 
tax system. For example, Musgrave and Thin (1948) examined a variety of 
formulas for calculating the degree of progression of a personal income tax 
system. Much earlier, Mill (1921) sought to ascertain whether one could pro- 
duce a progressive income tax regime if one knew consumers’ marginal utili- 
ties of income; Samuelson (1947) made this approach more precise. 
Most recently, Feldstein (1976), Atkinson (1980), and Plotnick (1981) 
have rekindled interest in horizontal equity. In an important recent paper, 
King (1983) unified consideration of the vertical and horizontal character- 
istics of tax systems by using a social welfare function approach suggested 
by these earlier papers. 
In this recent literature, the term vertical equity refers to any compari- 
son of the after-tax income distributions generated by tax systems. Meas- 
ures of vertical equity (or inequity) are essentially  measures of after-tax in- 
come inequality. The term horizontal equity in this literature refers to the 
measurement of any characteristic of a tax system that requires the use of 
the prior- or pretax positions of taxpayers. For example, a measure of 
horizontal equity or inequity might require the use of the pretax income of 
each consumer. 
It is possible to construct a general framework that incorporates this 
scheme as well as others. A set of pretax attributes is postulated to be a 
vector space of variables such as location, income, and marital status par- 
ameterized in Euclidean space. There is a vector of pretax attributes asso- 
ciated with each consumer. If a tax system is defined to be a map from any 
vector of pretax attributes of a consumer to  after-tax income, then it is im- 
possible to separate the ranking of  tax systems from the distribution of 
pretax attributes. This is due to the idea that a tax system that has an in- 
equitable feature that applies to no consumer should not be ranked differ- 
ently from a tax system without this feature, Hence, an equity concept (of 
any type) is defined to be any ordering over the product of tax systems and 
attribute distributions; a tax system-attribute distribution pair is our ba- 
sic construct.  The measures of vertical and horizontal equity discussed 
above are all equity concepts in the sense just defined. 
In the literature described above, a restriction placed on horizontal eq- 
uity concepts is that there should be no rank reversals in moving from pre- 
tax to posttax income. In other words, if a tax system-attribute distribu- 
tion pair, (reflected, for example, by an effective tax rate and before-tax 
4.  Whether or not such index numbers indeed have all the desirable properties of their 
parent social welfare functions is discussed by Berliant and Strauss 1983. It should also be 
noted in this regard that if the operational measure of equity is a multivariate index number, 
it generally cannot be uniquely deduced from a social welfare function. 183  Horizontal and Vertical Equity Characteristics of  Federal Income Tax 
income pair of values) satisfies a no-rank-reversal condition, then this tax 
system-attribute  distribution pair ought to be placed in the highest equiv- 
alence class of the ordering associated with a horizontal equity concept (or 
the lowest equivalence class of the ordering associated with a horizontal 
inequity concept). We call the highest and lowest equivalence classes of an 
ordering the extreme equivalence classes generated by that ordering. 
Is the no-rank-reversal  condition  sufficient,  necessary, or both,  for 
placement of a tax system-attribute  distribution pair in an extreme equiv- 
alence class? It can be easily shown that such a condition is in fact only 
sufficient for placement in an extreme equivalence class. For example, 
this condition is only sufficient for the measures in King (1983). More gen- 
erally, any condition that is postulated to be sufficient to assign a tax system- 
attribute distribution pair satisfying the condition to an extreme equiv- 
alence class of an equity concept is called an equityprinciple. An example 
of an equity principle is the no-rank-reversal condition. It is obvious that 
some equity principles are stronger than others and that the weaker equity 
principles have larger extreme equivalence classes. 
The more traditional scheme that we employ below differs substantially 
from the horizontal-vertical scheme used by the authors listed above. The 
traditional ideas about equity with which we are concerned seem to  divide 
equity measures into three categories rather than the two noted above, 
while at the same time using a similar nomenclature.  Indeed, we believe 
that this has been the source of some confusion. Therefore, we use three 
terms-income  inequality, a concept of horizontal equity that we  label 
HE, and a concept of vertical equity that we  label VE-in  specific ways 
which we define below. These three concepts of equity correspond, in our 
view,  to precise definitions of older (or classical) notions of income in- 
equality, and vertical and horizontal equity. 
These three categories of equity concepts are used,  for example, by 
Musgrave (1959). By creating a distinction between the distributive and al- 
locative functions of government, Musgrave makes a distinction between 
income redistribution (a distributive idea), and the determination of the 
method of taxation for providing public goods (an allocative idea). The 
latter includes, as a partial solution, the use of  taxes based on ability to 
pay, which in turn includes as considerations vertical and horizontal equity. 
It is in this sense that we shall develop three equity concept classifications. 
The first category of equity concepts that we call income inequality is 
the same as the term vertical equity as used by the recent literature; it con- 
sists of all equity concepts that are functions of only the after-tax income 
distribution generated by a tax system-attribute  distribution pair. 
The second category of equity concepts, HE,  derives from the view, 
stated, for example, by Musgrave and Musgrave (1980):  “Perhaps the 
most widely accepted principle of equity in taxation is that people in equal 
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Of course, this statement is only an equity principle, not an equity con- 
cept. It requires that a tax system-attribute distribution pair that treats 
equals in the same manner be placed in an extreme equivalence class of an 
equity concept. However, the principle does indicate that one must be able 
to say who are equals and who are not equals in order to evaluate a tax 
system-attribute distribution pair.  Hence, we  divide the space of attri- 
butes into cells, where those in each cell are considered to be equals by the 
policy analyst. This may seem arbitrary, but must be done in order to use 
the traditional notion of equity, and, from a pragmatic point of  view, 
must be done in order to evaluate any index measure since data are always 
provided in aggregates. 
Once this classification is accomplished, an HE equity concept is an or- 
dering such that if the posttax income distribution for each cell of equals 
for two tax system-attribute distribution pairs is the same, then the two 
pairs are equivalent under the ordering. In this way only changes in the 
comparisons of  equals can alter the ranking of  a pair. In other words, 
equals are treated in the same manner by both pairs without regard to how 
unequals are treated. Examples of such measures can be found in Wertz 
(1975,1978) and Berliant and Strauss (1983).  Also,  Pechman and Okner 
(1974) study empirically variations in effective tax rates by income class; 
this is essentially an example of a measure of HE as well. 
Our development of the third equity concept, VE, is complementary  to 
the concepts of HE and distributional equity presented above. A measure 
of VE is defined to be an equity concept that is neither an HE equity con- 
cept nor an income inequality equity concept. That is, measures of VE do 
not depend solely on the posttax income distribution (they depend on 
some pretax variables), nor do they depend solely on the posttax position 
of equals. Thus, they involve pre- and posttax positions as well as com- 
parisons of taxpayers who are not equals. 
This completes the development of the two schemes for categorizing eq- 
uity  concepts. Note that the second, traditional classification scheme 
yields a finer, and, in our opinion, more natural partition of equity con- 
cepts. One can say more precisely what an index number is measuring 
when it is classified using the second scheme. The index numbers imple- 
mented empirically below to evaluate progressivity and equity are respec- 
tively VE, and HE satisfying the principle of treating equals equally. 
Moving now to an examination of the two equity principles used most 
frequently  in the recent literature-those  principles dealing with no-rank- 
reversal and equals-treated-equally-it  can be shown using two counter- 
examples that neither one implies the other. That is, equals-treated-equally is 
neither necessary nor sufficent for a tax system-attribute distribution pair 
to satisfy the no-rank-reversal criterion. 
For the first counterexample, taxpaying units are evenly divided be- 
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the brackets have the same width and the same internal distribution within 
each bracket.  The brackets  also have substantial space between them 
without  any taxpaying  units  (see fig.  6.1).  Further,  suppose the tax- 
transfer system maintains the overall distribution of these units, but is 
such that the corresponding units in each band switch places. Certainly, 
given that these units within each band are considered to be equals, this 
tax system conforms to the classical notion of equity, that of equals being 
treated equally. However, this tax system also plays havoc with the rank 
ordering of all of the units. Thus, changes in the rank ordering do not im- 
ply that there are horizontal inequities present in the tax system. 
Two  obvious objections may be raised to the structure of this example. 
First, the term equals is never defined; but this is not needed since the 
bands can be made as narrow as necessary (even degenerate). Second, no 
real-income distribution looks like this one. However, it is equally obvi- 
ous that this example may be embedded in a larger distribution while 
maintaining its purpose and conclusion. 
The second counterexample postulates a pretax regime with one narrow 
income bracket in which the entire population is concentrated (see fig. 
6.2). Suppose the tax-transfer system spreads the distribution proportion- 
ally over a much wider range (i.e., its support becomes larger). Certainly 
the rank ordering of all individuals does not change under this tax scheme. 
Also, if the pretax income band is narrow enough to allow all taxpaying 
units to be considered equals, then the tax system is not horizontally equi- 
table in the classical or HE sense; some taxpayers receive windfalls while 
others experience huge losses through imposition of the tax system. Thus, 
tax  systems characterized  by  horizontal inequities do not  necessarily 
change the rank order of taxpaying units. 
These counterexamples have demonstrated that each equity principle 
must be justified independent of the other if one is used as an underlying 
assumption for the measurement of horizontal equity. Of  course, they 
Pre - Tax  Post -Tax 
Equals in GroupA  Equals in Group B 
Income 
Equals in GroupA 
Equals  in Group B 
Number of Taxpaying  Units  Number of Taxpaying  Units 
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Fig. 6.2. 
might also enter as constraints in other models. However, the following 
result relates the two principles in a different way: 
PROPOSITION:  If cells of equals are singletons  in the space of  attribute^,^ and 
equals are not treated equally by a tax system-distribution pair, then there 
exists a ranking of taxpayers so that the tax system reverses some ranks. If 
a tax system-attribute  distribution pair generates a rank reversal, then 
there exists a set of cells of equals in the space of attributes such that 
equals are not treated equally. 
In summary, we have treated classification schemes for equity concepts 
or measures of vertical and horizontal equity to clarify some semantic 
problems and to uncover the assumptions behind various measures. We 
have also examined the relationships between two commonly used equity 
principles. To develop a specific measure, one must not only decide on a 
classification  scheme and category along with perhaps an equity principle, 
but must make other assumptions as well. We  have indicated where the 
measures that we favor fit in; a more complete mathematical development 
of them may be found in Berliant and Strauss (1984). 
To compare a variety of other approaches, a broad selection of index 
numbers are calculated in the empirical work that follows. Their algebraic 
statements in consistent notation may be found in Appendix A. 
6.2.2 
We now turn to the matter of providing operational criteria that permit 
us to make distinctions between horizontal and vertical equity in the sense 
of HE and VE; we provide here the criteria used to classify pairs of attri- 
butes. To describe the vertical characteristics of the tax system, we follow 
Wertz (1978) and partition taxpayers into three parts: the fraction of tax- 
payers whose tax liability is progressively distributed, $;  the fraction of 
Classifications of Vertical and Horizontal Equity 
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taxpayers whose tax liability is proportionately distributed, 8; and, the 
fraction  of  taxpayers  whose tax liability is  regressively distributed,  y. 
Note that by construction, qb  + 8 + y  = 1  .O.  Also, note that the concepts 
employed are relative concepts obtained by making pairwise comparisons 
of relative income and effective tax rate positions. A comparison of  two 
taxpayers shows progressivity when both the income and effective tax rate 
of one taxpayer are greater than the income and tax rate of  another tax- 
payer. Proportionality occurs when the incomes of the two taxpayers be- 
ing compared are different, but the effective tax rates are the same. Finally, 
regressivity is said to occur when one taxpayer has a larger income but a 
lower effective tax rate than the other in the comparison. 
To ascertain the extent to  which taxes are distributed progressively, pro- 
portionately, and regressively, we take into account not only the number 
of occurrences of each type of comparison, but also the degree of income 
and tax rate disparities. Our subjective judgment is that it matters when 
scoring such comparisons whether person A with tax rate of  28 percent 
and person B with tax rate of  20 percent have similar or very different in- 
comes. Thus, actual measurement involves the weighting of each compari- 
son count by the absolute difference in income of each pair of taxpayers. 
Similarly, it would seem to matter whether the tax rates of A and B are 
similar or very different. If A has an income of  $30,000 and B an income 
of $15,000, it would seem important to observe whether the respective tax 
rates were 28 percent and 20 percent, or 32 percent and 18 percent. The 
former would  seem to be less progressive than the latter comparison. 
When we account for differences in tax rates, however, we weight by the 
ratio of tax rates rather than the difference in tax rates. We do this for sev- 
eral reasons. First, using the ratio distinguishes more effectively between a 
paired comparison of tax rates of 14 percent and 10 percent, and 54 per- 
cent and 50 percent. While the differences are both 4 percent, the former 
pair of tax rates are clearly more disparate. Second, using the ratio of 
rates deals with proportional comparisons. Recall that if the tax rates in a 
paired comparison were the same, the difference in rates would yield a 
weight of  zero, while the ratio would yield a weight of  one. In the second 
case the property of the three types of comparisons adding to 1  .O is main- 
tained, whereas under the first weighting scheme, proportional compari- 
sons, because of zero weights, drop out. 
It should be noted that our analysis of  tax ratehncome positions is 
based on effective  rates of taxation and pretax income as classification cri- 
teria. Another approach would be to compare individuals in terms of how 
much income they retain after taxation, or their after-tax income. The two 
are obviously related.  If  the effective tax rate is  t,  then the after-tax- 
income approach to measuring vertical equity involves making compari- 
sons of the quantity (1 -  t) among pairs of taxpayers. The scoring of com- 
parisons in terms of progressivity, regressivity, and porportionality would 
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to occur when the fraction of retained or after-tax income declined as in- 
come rose. It can be shown,6  however, that using the after-tax-income ap- 
proach results in index numbers that are not invariant to scalar multiplica- 
tion. Because such invariance is generally viewed as a desirable property 
of index numbers, and the after-tax approach fails to maintain it, we shall 
use the effective tax rates calculated as the ratio of  net taxes to pretax in- 
come. 
Horizontal equity in the sense of  HE, unlike vertical equity, does not 
admit  of  progressive, proportional,  or  regressive distinctions  in  our 
framework, but a disparity in treatment of those in the same position. Ac- 
cordingly, we shall measure the extent to which effective rates are different- 
instances  of  inequity-and  instances in  which  effective rates  are the 
same-instances  of equity-for  pairs of taxpayers. As with our measure 
of vertical equity, we shall weight the count of such comparisons by the ra- 
tio of effective tax rates, since greater disparities in ratios of tax rates are 
taken to reflect greater horizontal inequity. 
Both the horizontal and vertical measures are obtained by making all 
possible comparisons among pairs of  taxpayers and accumulating the 
weighted counts of each type of classification. Note that in case of the ver- 
tical comparisons, a tax system may be said to have, simultaneously, pro- 
gressive, regressive, and proportional components. This occurs because 
the comparisons are relative, and the number of comparisons are numer- 
ous; for n  individuals, there are n(n - 1) comparisons. Normalization of 
the accumulation of each of the three possible weighted, vertical counts 
by the sum of the three components provides a description of the fraction 
of comparisons that are progressive, proportional, and regressive, and as 
such, provides a simple index score that can be compared over time for 
various possible tax schemes. Normalization of the weighted counts of 
horizontal equity and inequity by their sum provides the same sort of  in- 
formation.'  See Appendix A for a presentation, in tabular form, of the al- 
gebra of various index numbers implemented below.  * 
6.3  Data, Measurement  Considerations, and Other Index Numbers 
6.3.1  Data Sources and Limitations 
In order to measure repeatedly the distribution of federal personal in- 
come taxes, we use the publicly available samples of individual income tax 
6.  See Berliant and Strauss 1983. 
7.  A more complete development of the intuition and mathematics of these and related, 
multiperiod index numbers may be found in Appendix 1 of Berliant and Strauss 1983. 
8.  The index numbers considered throughout this paper relate ex post effective tax rates 
to pretax economic income. Often it is of interest to compare ex ante effective tax rates under 
different tax regimes. For an analagous set of index numbers that keep track of the relative 
position of taxpayers under different tax regimes, see Berliant and Strauss 1983. 189  Horizontal and Vertical Equity Characteristics  of Federal Income Tax 
returns maintained by the National Archives. Each year, the Statistics of 
Income (SOI) Division of the Internal Revenue Service creates a random, 
stratified sample  of  several hundred  thousand  individual tax  returns 
which are used for the annual publication Statistics of Income Individual 
Income Tax Returns. A sample of this file is typically drawn by the U.S. 
Treasury Department for revenue-estimating purposes in support of tax 
legislation. This sample is used in conjunction with the department’s mi- 
crosimulation model of the individual income tax,9 and is usually de- 
scribed as the tax model data file. 
Also, SO1 creates a sample from its large SO1 sample and provides it an- 
nually to  the National Archives. This public-use sample of anonymous in- 
dividual income tax returns is usually at least twice the size of the sample 
provided to the Treasury Department, though it is less complete than the 
Treasury sample in that the Office of Tax Analysis usually synthetically 
adds  additional  income  information  to the  sample  and creates  new 
weighting schemes to permit the sample to forecast for more recent peri- 
ods. At the time this project was initiated (1980),  annual files for 1966 
through 1977 were available from the National Archives and are accord- 
ingly the focus of this study. 
As is well known, information on the income and tax position of indi- 
viduals and families is available from a variety of sources; each source has 
certain strengths and weaknesses. The files used in this study reflect the in- 
come and individual income taxes of taxpayers. Other files such as the 
Current  Population  Survey (CPS) are much richer sources of  demo- 
graphic information and information about nonwage income. The CPS 
data base contains the richest information about nonwage income, but 
does not have actual data on taxes paid. Researchers interested in using 
this broad definition of income have had to either match tax information 
synthetically or simulate personal taxes to examine effective tax rates. The 
SO1 data base contains actual tax information, but does not have as broad 
a definition of income as these other sources. Thus, the SO1 does not have 
information about low-income individuals, neither are they in the file nor 
are their sources of income given. Various cash and noncash sources of 
transfer income are not recorded for federal tax purposes and are thus un- 
available to this study. Since variations in effective tax rates over time is 
the primary subject matter of our research, we have chosen to utilize the 
richer source of information on taxes actually paid by individuals and sac- 
rificed access to a broader definition of income. 
Both the SO1 and CPS information fail to reflect nonmarket income 
captured by the personal income concept in the national income accounts. 
Personal income, as defined in the national income and product accounts, 
9.  See Wyscarver 1978 for a description of the simulation model and techniques used to 
extrapolate historical data to more current time periods. 190  Marcus C. BerlisntIRobert  P.  Strauss 
is substantially broader than adjusted gross income, total money income, 
or the concept of economic income we  were able to construct from the 
available data files. Our income concepts do  not capture, for example, in- 
terest on state and local bonds, which is tax exempt for federal purposes 
and therefore not reported on tax forms. 
Table 6.1 displays the components of  economic income available for 
this study. Such items as wages and salaries, interest and dividend income 
(return to capital), and types of business income from farming, sole pro- 
prietorships, rents, and royalties are contained in our measure, as are such 
items as long- and short-term capital gains, gains from installment sales, 
and pension income. 
Table 6.1  Comuonents of Economic Income Used in Analysis by Year 
Component of Income  66  67  68  69  70  71  72  73  74  75  76  77 
Wages and salaries  xxxxxxxxxxxx 
Interest income  xxxxxxxxxxxx 
Gross dividends  xxxxxxxxxxxx 
Interest income  xxxxxxxxxxxx 
Gross business or 
profession income  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Short-termcapitalgains  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Long-term net capital 
gains  xxxxxxxxxxxx 
Farm income  xxxxxxxxxxxx 
Rental income  xxxxxxxxxxxx 
Royalty income  xxxxxxxxxxxx 
Partnership income  xxxxxxxxxxxx 
Small business 
corporationincome  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Estateandtrustincome  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Taxable portion of 
Capital gain distributions  xxxxxx 
pensions  xx  XXXXlll 
Gross pensions  xxx  xxx 
Alimony  22222xxxxxxx 
Fully taxable pensions  xxxxxx 
State income tax refunds  2  2  2  2  2  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Premature distribution 
from IRAs and Keogh  - 
plans  2222222222x2 
Miscellaneous income  X  X  X  x  2  X  X  2 X  X  X  5 
Supplemental schedule 
gains  xxxxxx 
Ordinary gains  xxxxxx 
Other gains  xxxxxx 
Sources: SO1 files. 
Nores:  (1)  Shown separately but also included in gross pension; (2) included in miscel- 
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Table 6.2  Comparison of Income Concept Used in Study to Adjusted Gross 
Income and BEA Personal Income Concepts ($ in billions) 
Sample/ 
Sample  Economic  BEA Pers.  Sample  BEA  BEA Wages 

































































































'Number of  returns on SO1 data file. 
bSee text for definition. 
Table 6.2 displays the number of (unweighted) observations used by 
year in the analysis below, along with the total economic income and ad- 
justed gross income (AGI) that were on the annual tapes.I0 Our measure 
of economic income was typically 1 to 3 percent larger than adjusted gross 
income each year, though considerably smaller than the personal income 
measure estimated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). A sizeable 
portion of the difference between either AGI or our measure of economic 
income and personal income is due to various types of transfer payments. 
Since many of these transfer payments accrue to nontaxable, low-income 
individuals and families and do not affect their tax status (they simply are 
not in the tax system and are not taxable), part of the discrepancy between 
personal income and our measure of income is not problematical for our 
purpose. That is, since the purpose of this study is to measure the vertical 
and horizontal characteristics of the tax system, the fact that some types 
of income are not in our measure is not problematical to the extent that 
such income accrues to those outside the tax system. 
The last columns in table 6.2 indicate wages and salaries in our data files 
in comparison to those estimated by BEA. Of interest here is that the cov- 
erage ratio is quite high-between  95 and 99 percent. Thus, at least for 
wage and salary income, our estimates of the vertical and horizontal equity 
of the tax system should be reliable. 
10.  It should be noted that our control totals of  weighted, adjusted gross income com- 
pared favorably with published totals in the pertinent Statistics of Income publication or 
that displayed in table 8.13 of the 1981 supplement to the Survey of Current Business, U.S. 
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6.3.2  Other Index Numbers, and Computational and Related 
Considerations 
As noted earlier, there is a substantial index-number literature devoted 
to ascertaining the structure of  income inequality.  Since this  project 
involved the repeated computer analysis of better than 1.29 million (anon- 
ymous) tax returns,"  we  implemented, in addition to the vertical and 
horizontal measures developed above, seventeen other measures of the 
vertical distribution of after-tax income, and one additional measure of 
the horizontal distribution of taxes which we gleaned from the literature. 
Appendix A provides in a consistent mathematical form these index num- 
bers and the appropriate reference. Of interest is that sometimes various 
students of index numbers have different definitions of what is purport- 
edly the same index number.'* 
With roughly 100,OOO  observations per year, calculation of each inde- 
pendent vertical measure, say y and 4,  would require 1 x  1O'O calculations 
each per year, which was clearly too burdensome computationally. In or- 
der to make the computations tractable, we elected to classify returns into 
25 income classes, and  114 tax rate classes.'3 This dimensionality was 
used in our earlier study, and thus permits comparison of results from the 
Treasury and public-use SO1 data bases. The finer division of tax rates is 
justified by our interest in the extent of progressivity in the system. Be- 
cause we performed the analysis over time, we  created income intervals 
that corresponded to 4 percent of the weighted number of tax returns each 
year.  I ' 
11.  For  each year under study, substantial effort  was involved in converting and checking, 
against published tables, the twelve data files from the National Archives. Their files pro- 
vided to the project were in IBM packed decimal format. We then converted them to Dec 
ASCII, extracted the relevant variables for the analysis, constructed control totals of  AGI 
and the cumulative distributions in $500 intervals to choose proper income intervals, and 
performed the index number calculations per se. On average, each file was passed four 
times. Even using high-density storage formats, many years required the use of multireel 
data files. 
12. CompareTheil 1967 with Bourguignon 1979, for example. 
13. Even this reduction in the size of  the computation problem results in many calcula- 
tions. Using a 25x1 14 matrix creates 2,850 cells which need to be compared to  2,849 cells or 
8.1 million potential comparisons. Of course, many cells are empty (low-income taxpayers 
do  not face high effective rates (and vice versa), so  initial identification of nonzero cells can 
reduce materially the computational burden. Generally, under 1  ,ooO  cells needed to be con- 
sidered. Copies of the algorithms developed for this project are available from the authors 
upon request. 
As is apparent from the mathematics of  our vertical and horizontal index numbers, the di- 
mensionality of the income classes and tax rate classes will affect the overall level of  results 
obtained. In our  earlier study, Berliant and Strauss 1983, we experimented with widening the 
tax rate intervals from single percentage points, as implemented in this paper, to intervals of 
four percentage points. The vertical equity scores remained essentially the same, while hori- 
zontal equity levels rose. In particular, this fourfold widening in the tax rate classification 
was accompanied by a twofold improvement in the measured level of horizontal equity. 
14.  It is worth noting hefe that the income intervals we used are rather different than 
those used routinely over the years by the Treasury Department in their policy analysis. Gen- 
erally, our  income classes are much finer in the lower and middle ranges of the income distri- 193  Horizontal and Vertical Equity Characteristics  of Federal Income Tax 
In our earlier study we found that stratifying the analysis by type of fil- 
ing unit (single, married filing jointly, married filing separately, and head 
of household) revealed the greatest differences in horizontal and vertical 
equity, as contrasted with other strata such as those who itemized and 
those who did not. Accordingly, we stratified our analysis by filing type, 
and, in 1974, by whether or not a spouse with wage and salary income was 
present.  Unfortunately,  limitations of  funding for computer resources 
prevented the complete exploitation of this very rich set of data.” 
6.4  Empirical Results 
We present here the empirical results of applying the index numbers de- 
veloped above, and detailed in Appendix A, to the data for 1966-77, in 
terms of  overall measures of  vertical and horizontal equity and stratified 
by filing status. 
6.4.1  Overall Results,  1966-77 
Panel A of table 6.3 presents the overall results for all filers and indi- 
cates that the extent of overall progressivity in the U.S. personal income 
tax was high. In 1968, 97.7 percent of the weighted vertical comparisons 
displayed progressivity. This represents the highest progressivity score re- 
corded over the study period. The lowest progressivity score recorded was 
in  1966 when only 87.5  percent  of  the vertical comparisons  displayed 
progressivity. Our vertical results with the public-use SO1 data correspond 
to those obtained with the Treasury tax model sample and reported in Ber- 
liant and Strauss (1983). The latter data source recorded vertical progres- 
sivity scores of .882 in 1973 and .891 in 1975 while the public data source 
recorded scores of  .890 in  1973 and .871 in  1975. As noted earlier, the 
Treasury tax model sample contains certain income imputations not avail- 
able in the public samples, and, in the years in question, contained only 
50,000.  l6 
Since the vast majority of vertical comparisons display progressivity, it 
is not surprising that relatively small amounts of regressivity and propor- 
tionality are observed. Generally, between 8 to 11 percent of the compari- 
sons display regressivity, and between 1 to 2 percent of  the comparisons 
display proportionality. 
bution compared to their classifications;  the Treasury income groupings tend to focus atten- 
tion on higher-income  taxpayers. For  general, statistical  purposes, use of the four percentage 
point intervals is the more appropriate  methodology. 
15. Also due to resource limitations, we have been unable to analyze in a parallel manner 
the panel of matched personal tax returns jointly provided to the project by the Statistics Di- 
vision of the Internal Revenue Service, Social Security Administration,  and the Office of Tax 
Analysis, U.S. Treasury Department. 
16.  Horizontal equity scores are, however, notably different. Those obtained using the 
Treasury data suggest greater inequity. 194  Marcus C. BerlianURobert  P.  Straws 
Table 6.3  Vertical and Horizontal Index Values 
A.  All Filers 
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C. Married Filing Separately 
Year  Prog%  Reg%  Prop%  Equity%  Ineq%  AvgRate  Gini 
1966  0.849 
1967  0.843 
1968  0.974 
1969  0.804 
1970  0.859 
1971  0.885 
1972  0.866 
1973  0.863 
1974  0.783 
1975  0.821 
1976  0.872 
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Table 6.3  (continued) 
D.  Married Filing Jointly 


































































































Year  hog%  Regr %  Prop %  Equity %  Ineq%  Avg Rate  Gini 
1966  0.942  0.038  0.020  0.467  0.533  0.241  0.486 
1967  0.937  0.043  0.020  0.465  0.535  0.220  0.497 
1968  0.981  0.000  0.019  0.443  0.557  0.261  0.497 
1969  0.944  0.041  0.015  0.433  0.567  0.244  0.487 
1970  0.934  0.041  0.025  0.522  0.478  0.224  0.476 
1971  0.945  0.032  0.023  0.556  0.444  0.258  0.489 
1972  0.939  0.037  0.025  0.564  0.436  0.227  0.496 
1973  0.934  0.046  0.020  0.516  0.484  0.365  0.482 
1974  0.912  0.071  0.017  0.458  0.542  0.437  0.468 
1975  0.915  0.063  0.022  0.457  0.543  0.507  0.480 
1976  0.926  0.050  0.024  0.530  0.530  0.266  0.470 
1977  0.895  0.085  0.020  0.448  0.552  0.511  0.476 
Over time there is evidence of a decline in progressivity; the Pearson 
correlation between progressivity and time is -  .74 (see table 6.4). There is 
also a modest corresponding upward drift in the fraction of comparisons 
displaying  proportionately  over  time.  When  there  are  increases  in 
progressivity, they are accompanied by decreases in observed regressivity 
in the system, and vice versa.'* 
While the U.S. tax system displays substantial progressivity over the pe- 
riod  1966-77,  it also displays very substantial horizontal inequity. No 
more than 21 percent of the weighted comparisons of taxpayers in the 
17.  The simple correlation between time and the fraction of comparisons displaying pro- 
portionality is .7067. See table 6.4 for various bivariate correlation coefficients. 
18.  The simple correlation between progressivity and regressivity over the study period is 
-  .9901. Since the VE index numbers have two degrees of freedom, any bivariate correlation 
among pairs of VE scores is nontautological. 'hble 6.4  Correlations among Index Numbers 
YR  PROG%  REGR%  PROP%  EQUITY%  INEQ%  AVINC  VAR  CO  MD  GINI  AG 
YR  1.oooO  -0.7388  0.7067  0.21%  0.1604  -0.1604  0.9820  0.%22  -0.6425  0.9807  -0.6776  -0.6748 
PROG%  1.oooO  -0.9901  -0.0548  0.0647  -0.0647  -0.7390  -0.7225  0.5874  -0.7223  0.7057  0.7035 
REGR%  1.oooO  -0.0854  -0.1748  0.1748  0.7002  0.6983  -0.5170  0.6817  -0.6974  -0.6947 
PROP%  1.oooO  0.8029  -0.8029  0.2640  0.1633  -0.4776  0.2806  -0.0165  -0.0197 
EQUITY%  1.oooO  -1.oooO  0.1549  0.1062  -0.2251  0.1716  0.0331  0.04% 
INEQ%  1.oooO  -0.1549  -0.1062  0.2251  -0.1716  -0.0331  -0.04% 
AVINC  1.oooO  0.9789  -0.6769  0.9980  -0.6726  -0.6740 
VAR  1.oooO  -0.5205  0.9732  -0.6832  -0.6880 
co  1.oooO  -0.6773  0.4941  0.4815 
MD  1.oooO  -0.6259  -0.6270 
GINI  1.oooO  0.9983 
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same economic circumstance demonstrate similar effective tax rates. In 
1969, measured horizontal equity was at its low point with only 15 percent 
of the weighted comparisons of taxpayers in the same economic circum- 
stance demonstrating similar effective tax rates. We may conclude then 
that the federal personal income tax is both progressive and horizontally 
inequitable. 
In our earlier study we conjectured that increases in vertical progres- 
sivity might be accompanied by reductions in horizontal equity. However, 
examination of the overall pattern of progressivity and horizontal equity 
fails to reveal any systematic relationship.  The correlation between the 
fractions of observed progressive comparisons and horizontally equitable 
comparisons is -  .05. 
If we use the weighted coefficient of  variation in effective tax rates as 
our measure of horizontal inequity, then we observe several regularities. 
Recall that this measure is the (weighted) sum of coefficients of variation 
in effective tax rates within each income bracket, and thus reflects the rel- 
ative amount of within-income bracket dispersion in effective tax rates. 
This measure of horizontal inequity suggests that there has been, over the 
period 1966-77, between 30 to 50 percent variation in effective tax rates 
within income classes-a  substantial amount of variation. Also, it ap- 
pears that this variation is increasing over time; the simple correlation be- 
tween it and time is .73. Since 1973 the coefficient of variation exceeded 40 
percent in three of the four years under study. 
We  also display in table 6.3 the Gini coefficient of  income inequality. 
Interestingly, some evidence exists that the equality in after-tax income is 
increasing over time; the simple correlation between the Gini and time is 
-  .67. More intriguing, however, is the relationship between income in- 
equality as captured by the Gini and horizontal inequity as captured by 
the weighted coefficient of variation in effective tax rates. The simple cor- 
relation between the two measures is -  .531, which is statistically signifi- 
cant at the 95 percent confidence level. This suggests that when the distri- 
bution of  after-tax income becomes more equal, the increased equality is 
accompanied by greater horizontal inequity. 
6.4.2  Results by Filing Type, 1966-77 
The results of the calculated index numbers by filing type are contained 
in panels B through E of table 6.3. The high levels of progressivity found 
in panel A, the overall results, are evident for head-of-household, married- 
filing-separately,  married-filing-jointly,  and  single  taxpayers.  Among 
these  four  types  of  taxpayers,  single taxpayers  display  the  greatest 
progressivity. Single taxpayers displayed progressivity in better than 91 
percent  of the weighted comparisons in all but one of the years under 
study, while none of the other types of taxpayers displayed such progres- 
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Not only does the federal tax system achieve its vertical objective most 
effectively with single taxpayers, it achieves its horizontal equity objective 
most effectively with them as well. Single taxpayers demonstrated hori- 
zontal equity from 43 percent to 56 percent of  the comparisons, depend- 
ing on the year in question. By contrast, married-filing-jointly taxpayers 
displayed horizontal equity in only 9 to 10 percent of  the weighted com- 
parisons. Undoubtedly the absence of significant variation in exemptions 
for single taxpayers and the fact that the vast majority of single taxpayers 
do not itemize explain these two results. 
Both single and married filing jointly taxpayers display a downward 
drift in the degree of progressivity in their vertical comparisons over time. 
The simple correlations between time and the progressivity scores are 
-  .74 and -  .53 re~pectively.'~  Thus, while there is no apparent overall 
movement in the extent of progressivity in the tax system, there appears to 
be a modest downward trend in the cases of single and married-filing- 
jointly taxpayers.*O 
6.4.3  Other Filing Strata 
In addition to stratifying the analysis by type of tax schedule, we  per- 
formed analyses for single and itemized returns over the period 1966-72, 
and for strata of returns in 1974 corresponding to the presence or absence 
of wage and salary by sex. 
Table 6.5 displays our horizontal and vertical measures for itemizers 
and non-itemizers. Again, we see that progressivity is substantial for both 
types of filers, perhaps contradicting the notion of some that itemized de- 
ductions reduce the progressivity of the system. In two of the seven years 
for which the analysis was performed, itemized returns actually displayed 
somewhat greater progressivity. However, substantial differences can be 
seen in the horizontal equity scores between itemizers and nonitemizers, 
as might be expected. Generally, equity is apparent in only 7 to 8 percent 
of the comparisons among taxpayers who itemized during the study pe- 
riod,  while comparable  figures for nonitemizers are 29 to 37  percent. 
These results compare favorably with those obtained in our earlier study. 
As with the earlier overall results, there are no apparent temporal rela- 
tions for itemizers and nonitemizers, nor is there any apparent relation- 
ship between equity and progressivity scores. 
Stratification by the presence or absence in wage and salary earnings by 
sex provides some interesting comparisons (see table 6.6). For example, 
19.  Detailed tables supporting these findings are available from the authors upon request 
and are omitted here due to space limitations. 
20.  If one estimates simple regressions of the natural log of the progressivity score on the 
natural log of time for single and married-filing-jointly  taxpayers from the data in table 6.3, 
one obtains elasticities of  -.3  in the case of single taxpayers and  -.28  in  the case of 
married-filing-jointly  taxpayers with t-ratios in excess of 2.7. 200  Marcus C. Berliant/Robert P.  Strauss 
Table 6.5  Horizontal and Vertical Scores 
for Itemizers and Standard Mlers, 1966-72 
A.  Itemizers 
Year  bog%  Regr %  Prop%  Equity %  Inequity % 
1966  377  .lo2  .021  .084  .916 
1%7  2380  ,099  .021  .079  .921 
1%8  .978  .Ooo  .022  .0706  .924 
1969  .868  .114  .019  .074  .926 
1970  .862  .115  .023  .072  .928 
1971  374  .lo5  .021  .075  .925 
1972  389  .092  .019  .074  .926 
B.  Standard 
Prog %  Rep%  Prop %  Equity %  Inequity % 
379  .090  .032  .316  .684 
.876  .091  .032  .311  .689 
.%9  .Ooo  ,031  .301  .699 
.895  .079  .026  .311  .689 
.884  .082  .034  .366  .634 
.894  .076  .030  .316  ,684 
.903  .068  .029  ,293  .707 
Table 6.6  Horizontal and Vertical Scores by Number of Wage and Salary 
Earners (1974  data) 
Filing Unit  Prog %  Rep%  Prop %  Equity %  Inequity %  Gini  Av Rate 
Male W&S  .899  .082  .018  .181  319  .452  .292 
Female W&S  .926  .052  .022  .339  .661  .441  .257 





TOTAL  374  .lo8  .018  .154  346  .462  .415 
Male, Female  385  .089  .027  .099  .901  .244  .199 
when female wage and salary payments are the only earnings present, 
horizontal equity is much greater than in any other strata. In this case, 34 
percent of the comparisons display equity, compared to, for example, the 
overall figure of 15.4 percent. For returns that contained wage and salary 
for both men and women, the situation of working couples, we  find that 
progressivity is high at 88.5 percent, and horizontal inequity is also high at 
90.1 percent. Here, however, we also find that the after-tax distribution of 
income is equal as measured by the Gini coefficient. The Gini for working 201  Horizontal and Vertical Equity Characteristics  of Federal Income Tax 
couples is .244, almost half of the overall Gini of .462. This suggests that 
working couples found themselves in similar after-tax-income positions, 
and may reflect that wage rates in 1974 for working couples were compa- 
rable when viewed in terms of family units. 
The case in which neither male nor female wages and salaries are pres- 
ent displays the least amount of progressivity and equity of the strata ex- 
amined. These, of course, would be individuals who receive only non- 
labor  income  or  retirement  or  capital  income.  Note  too  that  these 
taxpayers have the most unequal distribution of after-tax income; their 
Gini is .652 compared to the overall figure of .462. 
6.4.4  Relations among All Index Numbers 
As noted earlier, table 6.4 contains the simple correlations among the 
twenty-three index numbers (and time) investigated for all filers. There is 
much information that we will not attempt to summarize here; however, 
several general comments are in order. First, there is a high intercorrela- 
tion among the various income inequality measures. For example, the 
Gini is highly correlated with a wide variety of measures such as the vari- 
ance in income, the coefficient of income concentration, Atkinson’s three 
measures (his Gini, and his I evaluated at .3 and .7), the measures of the 
relative mean deviation, and so forth. Thus, while many of these meas- 
ures have different numerical values, when compared for a moment in 
time, or across time, they tend to move closely together and in effect con- 
tain similar information. 
While the inequality measures are generally highly correlated with each 
other, they are not always correlated with our measures of progressivity  or 
regressivity. Thus, to the extent one wishes to measure VE in the sense 
used above, some of the income inequality measures can fail to capture 
VE  type effects. Simple correlations between our progressivity measure 
and Atkinson’s I (.7) were only .42, while the analagous correlation with 
Theil’s measure was .85. This is not surprising, of course, since the in- 
equality measures are not expected to capture the VE effects. This sug- 
gests, in turn, that if progressivity or regressivity is of interest to the ana- 
lyst and the VE concept is persuasive, then some form of progressivity 
measure as we suggest is appropriate to the task, not an inequality meas- 
ure. Conversely, if one is interested in the extent to which income inequal- 
ity changes over time or as a result of proposed changes, then our VE mea- 
sures are inappropriate measures of such effects. 
6.5  Conclusion 
We have sought in this paper to create a theoretical framework that al- 
lows the comparison of traditional and more recent concepts of horizon- 
tal and vertical equity, and to characterize empirically the horizontal and 202  Marcus C. Berliant/Robert P. Strsuss 
vertical distribution of  federal individual income taxes over a significant 
period of  time. Theoretically, we have shown that the recent concept of 
horizontal equity, which requires that the pre- and posttax ranks of indi- 
viduals’ income positions be unchanged, is logically divorced from the 
traditional horizontal equity concept, which requires that the tax system 
impose identical effective tax rates on individuals in the same (pretax) eco- 
nomic position. 
Using carefully defined equity concepts and publicly available data for 
the period  1966-77,  we have found what appears to be substantial and 
continuing evidence of progressivity in the U.S.  personal income tax. 
However, we also have found substantial and continuing horizontal in- 
equity in the federal personal tax system. 
Stratification of our empirical analysis by type of tax schedule reveals 
that single persons experience  the greatest progressivity  and horizontal eq- 
uity in the system, while married-filing-jointly taxpayers experience the 
least amount of horizontal equity in the system. 
Examination of a wide variety of measures of after-tax income inequal- 
ity reveals that they do  not often capture the same information as the pro- 
posed vertical and horizontal equity measures, although they are highly 
related to  each other in the sense of being highly correlated. This empirical 
information is consistent with the above theoretical results. 
We have not sought in this chapter to “explain” the extent of measured 
vertical and horizontal equity, partly due to the size of the task and partly 
because the initial characterization of equity in the federal individual in- 
come tax over time seemed to be the proper point of departure. The extent 
of observed horizontal inequity is worthy of further study, as the observed 
discrepancies from some sort of norm of “acceptable” levels of horizontal 
inequity, compared to observed discrepancies between observed levels of 
progressivity and what is theoretically possible, would appear to be large. 
That is, observed progressivity appears to be at least 80 percent of what 
could be attained, whereas observed horizontal equity is only 10 percent 
of what could be attained. One may argue that the observed horizontal in- 
equities are the peculiarity of our tax system which provides for exemp- 
tions and beneficial tax treatment for various types of activity. However, 
it is remarkable that units with the same economic position, broadly de- 
fined, find themselves facing comparable tax rates in only 10 percent of 
possible comparisons. 
References 
Atkinson, A. B. 1970. On the measurement of inequality. Journal of Eco- 
nomic Theory 2:244-63. 203  Horizontal and Vertical Equity Characteristics  of Federal Income Tax 
.  1980. Horizontal equity and the distribution of the tax burden. In 
The economics of taxation, ed. H.  Aaron and M. J. Boskin. Washing- 
ton, D.C.: Brookings Institution. 
Berliant, M. C., and R. P.  Strauss. 1983. Measuring the distribution of 
personal taxes. In What role for  government? Lessons from  policy re- 
search, ed. R. Zeckhauser and D. Leebaert, 97-115.  Durham, N.C.: 
Duke University Press. 
. 1984. On recent expositions of  vertical and horizontal  equity. 
Carnegie-Mellon University. Mimeo. 
Blackorby, D., and D. Donaldson.  1976. Measures of equality and their 
meanings in terms of social welfare. University of British Columbia dis- 
cussion paper, no. 76-20. 
Bourguignon, F. 1979. Decomposable income inequality measures. Econ- 
ometrica47,  no. 4: 901-20. 
Bridges, B.,  Jr.  1978. In'tertemporal changes in tax rates. Studies in In- 
come Distribution,  11. Washington, D.C.:  GPO. Social Security Ad- 
ministration, Office of Research and Statistics. 
Feldstein, M. S.  1976. On the theory of tax reform. Journal of Public 
Economics6, nos. 1-2: 77-104. 
Fields, G. S., and J. C. H. Fei. 1978. On inequality comparisons. Econo- 
metrica46, no. 2: 303-16. 
Kendall, M. 1947. The advanced theory of statistics. London: Griffin and 
co  . 
Kiefer, Donald W.  1983. The characteristics of  the distributional tax 
progressivity measures.  Congressional  Research Service, Library of 
Congress. Mimeo. 
King, M. A. 1983. An index of inequality: With applications to horizon- 
tal equity and social mobility. Econometrica 5 1,  no. 1: 99-1 15. 
Kolm,  S. C.  1976. Unequal inequalities. Journal of Economic  Theory 
Kondor, Y.  1975. Value judgements implied by the use of  various meas- 
ures of income inequality. Review of Income and Wealth 21: 309-21. 
Mill, J. S. 1921. Principles ofpolitical economy. Ed. W.  J. Ashley. Lon- 
don: Longmans. 
Musgrave, R. A. 1959. The theory ofpublicfinance. New York: McGraw- 
Hill. 
Musgrave, R. A., and P.  B. Musgrave. 1980. Publicfinance in theory and 
practice. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Musgrave, R. A., and T. Thin. 1948. Income tax progression,  1928-48. 
Journalof Political Economy 56, no. 6:  498-514. 
Okner, B. A. 1979. Distributional aspects of tax reform during the past 
fifteen years. National Tax Journal32, no. 1: 11-28. 
Pechman,  J. A.,  and B. A.  Okner.  1974.  Who bears the tax burden? 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. 
12/13: 82-112. 204  Marcus C. BerlianURobert P. Strauss 
Plotnick, R. 1981. A measure of horizontal inequity. Review of Econom- 
.  1982. The concept and measurement of horizontal inequity. Jour- 
Pyatt, G. 1976. On the interpretation and the disaggregation of Gini coef- 
Rosen, H. 1978. An approach to  the study of income, utility, and horizon- 
Samuelson, Paul A. 1947. Foundations of  economic analysis. Cambridge: 
Sen, A. 1973. On economic inequality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Shorrocks, A. F.  1980. The class of additively decomposable inequality 
measures. Econometrica 48, no. 3: 613-25. 
Suits, D. B. 1975. Measurement of tax progressivity. American Economic 
Review 67, no. 4: 747-52. 
Theil, H.  1967. Economics and information theory. Amsterdam: North- 
Holland. 
U.S.  Department of Commerce. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 1981. The 
national income and products account of the United States, 1929-76: 
Statistical tables. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 
US.  Department of Treasury. Internal Revenue Service. 1966-77. Statis- 
tics of  Income: Individual Income  Tau Returns. Washington,  D.C.: 
GPO. 
Wertz, K. L. 1975. Empirical studies of tax burdens: Design and interpre- 
tation. Proceedings of the National Tax Association, Houston, 115-22. 
-.  1978. A method of measuring the relative taxation of families. 
Review of Economics and Statistics 60: 145-60. 
Wyscarver, R. 1978. The Treasury personal individual income tax simula- 
tion model. OTA Paper 32. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of 
the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy. Washington, D.C.:  GPO. 
icsandStatistics63, no. 2: 283-88. 
nalofPublicEconomics 17: 373-91. 
ficient. Economics Journal 86: 243-55. 
tal equity. Quarterly Journal of Economics 92: 307-22. 
Harvard University Press. 
Appendix A 
Algebraic Statement of  Various Index Numbers 
Key to symbols: 
I =  # of economic income classes 
A = # of after-tax income classes 
R = # of effective rate classes 
NJ = population in economic income class i, rate class J 
X’=  average income in economic income class i,  rate class J 
Zi  = average income in after-tax income class i 205  Horizontal and Vertical Equity Characteristics of Federal Income Tax 
Pi = population in after-tax income class i 
T, = Zi*Pi = total income in after-tax income class  i 
POP =  total population 
INC = total after-tax income 
D:= population in income class i,  change in effective rate class J 
Q = # of change in rate classes (difference between old and new ef- 
fective rates) 
I  I  RR 
VSUM=  c N:*Ni*lY:-  El*MAX(J/L,L/J) 
i=l  k=i+l  J=I  L=l 
IR  R 
i=l  J=l  L=J+I  2  i=l  J=I 
1  QQ 
DVSUM=~ c  c C 
i-l  k=i+l  J=l  L=l Table 6.A.1  Algebraic Statements for Alternative Vertical and Horizontal Index Numbers 
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Bble 6.A.2  Appendix B  Other Index Numbers 
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0.1922E+08  0.840  1847.  0.354  0.177 
0.1851E+08  0.799  1788.  0.332  0.166 
0.2061E+08  0.799  1881.  0.331  0.166 
0.2157E+08  0.869  1996.  0.373  0.187 
0.1779E+08  0.758  1937.  0.348  0.174 
0.2239E+08  0.794  2036.  0.341  0.171 
0.2506E+08  0.768  2211.  0.339  0.170 
0.3408E+08  0.855  2423.  0.355  0.177 
0.36673+08  0.850  2408.  0.338  0.169 
0.3427B+08  0.756  2715.  0.351  0.175 
0.4235E+08  0.805  2957.  0.366  0.183 
0.4610EfO8  0.809  3205.  0.382  0.191 
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Panel A. All Filers 
0.6071E+04  0.639  0.320  -17.880  0.1154E+14  8.201  1.231  2.670  0.302 
0.7311E+04  0.643  0.321  -  17.910  0.1252E+14  8.255  1.247  2.670  0.289 
0.7639E+04  0.654  0.327  -  17.910  0.1374E+ 14  8.301  1.294  2.689  0.310 
0.1041E+05  0.652  0.326  -18.030  0.1464E+14  8.340  1.294  2.819  0.323 
0.1123E+05  0.625  0.312  -18.030  0.1555E+14  8.459  1.155  2.745  0.292 
0.1200E+05  0.633  0.317  -  18.020  0.1673E+14  8.507  1.180  2.915  0.310 
0.1364E+05  0.638  0.319  -18.020  0.1875E+14  8.581  1.257  2.619  0.298 
0.1279E+05  0.651  0.325  -18.050  0.2054E+ 14  8.601  1.288  2.966  0.357 
O.l477E+O5  0.659  0.330  -  18.180  0.2212E+ 14  8.636  1.016  3.547  0.415 
O.l482E+O5  0.665  0.332  -18.170  0.2326E+14  8.643  1.314  4.030  0.471 
0.1984E+05  0.650  0.325  -18.156  0.2682E+14  8.827  1.227  2.989  0.318 
0.2058E+05  0.673  0.337  -18.350  0.2826E+ 14  8.754  1.310  4.667  0.498 
Panel B. Head of Household 
0.4391E+04  0.482  0.241  -14.490  0.2679E+ 12  8.266  0.478  1.879  0.243 
0.3814E+04  0.454  0.227  -  14.510  0.2970E+ 12  8.351  0.438  1.160  0.241 
0.3673E+04  0.456  0.228  -14.640  0.3543E+12  8.394  0.410  1.455  0.238 
0.4460E+04  0.514  0.257  -14.790  0.3897E312  8.257  0.610  1.903  0.285 
0.4456E+04  0.483  0.242  -15.090  0.5210E+12  8.311  0.535  2.242  0.257 
0.4281E+04  0.473  0.236  -  15.050  0.5615E+ 12  8.401  0.479  1.960  0.312 
0.6712E+04  0.471  0.235  -  15.180  0.7018E+12  8.514  0.549  1.450  0.318 
0.5196E+04  0.490  0.245  -  15.220  0.7932E+12  8.508  0.554  2.136  0.238 
0.7352E+04  0.477  0.238  -  15.350  0.8883E+12  8.599  0.418  1.873  0.329 
0.7772E+04  0.490  0.245  -15.320  0.9610E+12  8.645  0.576  2.051  0.351 
0.1253E+05  0.505  0.253  -15.455  0.1096E+13  8.659  0.707  2.214  0.344 
0.1171E+05  0.529  0.265  -  15.610  0.1252E+ 13  8.618  0.755  3.452  0.413 
Panel C. Married Filing Separately 
(10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18) 
0.3328E +04  0.591  0.295  -  14.850  0.2286E + 12  7.699  0.821  2.449  0.343 
0.4055E+04  0.576  0.288  -  14.820  0.2209E+ 12  7.749  0.815  2.984  0.286 
0.2813E+04  0.582  0.291  -  14.660  0.2467E+ 12  7.830  0.796  2.227  0.284 
0.7335E+04  0.648  0.324  -  15.050  0.2671E+ 12  7.805  0.897  3.683  0.287 
0.4364E+04  0.572  0.286  -14.540  0.2351E+12  8.004  0.744  2.495  0.325 
0.9628E+04  0.589  0.294  -  14.380  0.2191E+ 12  8.091  0.891  1.727  0.261 
0.6129E+04  0.554  0.277  -14.540  0.2767E312  8.183  0.722  1.968  0.294 
0.7127E+04  0.588  0.294  -14.630  0.3014E+12  8.132  0.930  2.900  0.315 
0.1151E+05  0.595  0.298  -  14.950  0.2904E+12  8.163  0.631  4.387  0.349 
0.1193Et05  0.626  0.313  -  14.790  0.2587E+ 12  8.101  1.039  5.219  0.413 
0.1484E+05  0.574  0.287  -  14.540  0.3051E+12  8.429  0.815  3.040  0.341 
0.1755E+O5  0.666  0.333  -  14.740  0.2172E+ 12  8.241  0.940  7.012  0.438 210  Marcus C. Berliant/Robert P. Straws 
Table 6.A.2 (continued) 
Panel D. Married Filing Jointly 
~  ~~ 
YR  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
67  8847.  0.4221E+08  0.734  3076.  0,348  0.174  0.348  0.066  0.163 
66  8339.  0.3575E+O8  0.717  2859.  0.343  0.171  0.343  0.064  0.158 
68  9483.  0.5065E+O8  0.751  3351.  0.353  0.177  0.353  0.068  0.167 
69  9842.  0.4663E+O8  0.694  3388.  0.344  0.172  0.344  0.062  0.159 
70  10430.  0.4861E+08  0.668  3516.  0,337  0.169  0.337  0.060  0.153 
71  11070.  0.6086E+08  0.705  3833.  0.346  0.173  0.346  0.064  0.163 
72  12140.  0.6937E+08  0.686  4158.  0.343  0.171  0.343  0.062  0.154 
73  12950.  0.8204E+08  0.699  4475.  0.346  0.173  0.346  0.064  0.163 
74  13590.  0.1285E+09  0.834  4806.  0.354  0.177  0.354  0.070  0.176 
75  14320.  0.9955E+08  0.697  5161.  0.360  0.180  0.360  0.069  0.185 
76  16007.  0.1190E+09  0.682  5584.  0.349  0.174  0.349  0.063  0.163 
77  16780.  0.1361E+09  0.695  6040.  0.360  0.180  0.360  0.069  0.189 
Panel E. Single 
~~  ~~  ~~  ~~  ~  ~  ~~  ~  ~~ 
YR  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
66  2832.  0.1054E+08  1.146  1375.  0.486  0.243  0.486  0.123  0.283 
67  2981.  0.1264E+08  1.193  1480.  0.497  0.248  0.497  0.125  0.283 
68  3169.  0.1486E+O8  1.216  1575.  0.497  0.248  0.497  0.130  0.292 
69  3250.  O.l346E+O8  1.129  1584.  0.487  0.244  0.487  0.123  0.281 
70  3651.  0.1502E+08  1.062  1739.  0.476  0.238  0.476  0.113  0.264 
72  4245.  0.2276E+O8  1.124  2104.  0.496  0.248  0.496  0.122  0.285 
73  4440.  0.2390E+08  1.101  2140.  0.482  0.241  0.482  0.120  0.279 
74  4630.  0.3121E+08  1.207  2167.  0.468  0.234  0.113  0.113  0.256 
75  5022.  0.2717E+08  1.038  2411.  0.480  0.240  0.480  0.119  0.286 
76  5829.  0.3729E+08  1.048  2737.  0.470  0.235  0.470  0.113  0.265 
77  5980.  0.3800E+08  1.031  2847.  0.476  0.238  0.476  0.116  0.281 
71  3878.  0.1951E+08  1.139  1897.  0.489  0.245  0.489  0.119  0.274 
Notes: 


















Coefficient of concentration 
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Panel D. Married Filing Jointly 
0.9878E +04 
0.9890E+04 
0.1200E +  05 
0.1520E +  05 
0.1543E +  05 
0.1765E +  05 
0.1888E+05 
0.1546E +  05 
0.2214E +05 
0.2224E +  05 
0.2763E +  05 
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0.1056E+ 14 
0.9681E+ 13 
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Panel E. Single 
(10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18) 
0.1569E+04  0.705  0.353  -16.760  0.1808E+13  7.426  1.201  2.213  0.241 
0.3852E+04  0.720  0.360  -16.900  0.1967E+13  7.487  1.225  2.025  0.220 
0.1913E+04  0.720  0.360  -  16.780  0.2191E+13  7.528  1.266  2.035  0.261 
0.2254E +  04  0.709  0.355  -  16.860  0.2290E+ 13  7.571  1.253  2.005  0.244 
0.6025E+04  0.688  0.344  -16.970  0.2413E+13  7.716  1.170  2.156  0.224 
0.7442E+04  0.702  0.351  -17.000  0.2553E+13  7.756  1.180  2.349  0.258 
0.8952E+04  0.705  0.352  -17.110  0.3082E+13  7.816  1.306  2.528  0.227 
0.4551E+04  0.692  0.346  -16.990  0.3473E+13  7.875  1.274  2.315  0.365 
0.5294E+04  0.696  0.348  -  17.200  0.3865E+ 13  7.965  0.783  2.867  0.437 
0.4986E+04  0.688  0.344  -  17.130  0.4133E+ 13  7.952  1.238  3.365  0.507 
0.8359E+04  0.672  0.336  -17.117  0.5052E+13  8.177  1.196  2.253  0.266 














Relative mean deviation  #1 
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Comment  T.  N. Srinivasan 
I have several criticisms of this very interesting chapter. 
Not only can taxpayers respond behaviorally to tax systems by rear- 
ranging their sources of income as the authors acknowledge in footnote 2 
(only to emphasize what they have ignored), but taxpayers can determine 
their filing status as well. As such, the analysis of various equity measures 
by filing status could be potentially affected by self-selection biases. Sec- 
ond, taxpayers can evade as well as avoid taxes-tax  systems and sources 
of income affect the feasibility as well as the probability of evasion and 
avoidance. In particular, a more equitable tax system compared to an- 
other  may be  less equitable once allowance for possible evasion and 
avoidance is made. 
The literature on income inequality measures that is based on social 
welfare rankings identifies individual income with individual welfare lev- 
els. Problems arise when one employs this literature to analyze the equity 
of tax systems-e.g.,  a tax return, even in the case of  a single taxpayer, 
may represent not only that person but others dependent on that person as 
well. It is not enough that deductions are allowed based on the numbers of 
dependents, even if we ignore the fact that by law, some categories of tax- 
payers such as nonresident aliens are not allowed deductions. Since such 
deductions do not depend on the level of income of the taxpayer, they 
need not equal the true “cost” of dependents to the taxpayer if such costs 
depend on income. Since more than one member of a household whose 
members pool their incomes and expenditures may file separate returns, 
posttax income associated with one of these returns is an indadequate in- 
dicator of household welfare. As long as society is organized in the form 
of households, it is household welfare that should enter as an argument in 
the social welfare function. 
Yet another dimension in assessing equity of tax systems should be their 
treatment of  identifiably transitory and permanent components of  in- 
come (a tax system based on consumption expenditure rather than meas- 
ured income will implicitly tax permanent income only, if it is the case that 
all transitory incomes are saved), of income streams of differing riskiness, 
etc. Most tax systems distinguish, however imperfectly,  between safer and 
risky incomes, but their differential treatments of these incomes do not 
usually depend on the level and composition of the income of taxpayers. 
Since attitudes towards risk (as well as perception of risk) may depend on 
income, once again from a welfare point of view, assessments of tax sys- 
tems that look only at effective tax rates and post- or pretax incomes are 
unsatisfactory. 
T.  N. Srinivasan is the Samuel C. Park, Jr., Professor of Economics at the Economic 
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Comparisons over time and space of equity measures are subject to 
well-known problems arising from price variations across space and time; 
the  same  posttax  nominal  income  may  correspond  to different  real- 
income levels depending on the location of taxpayers in the relevant in- 
come distribution.  (After all, because of various differences in quality, 
convenience, frequency of  purchase, volume of purchase, etc., the same 
broadly defined commodity may not cost the same for the poor and the 
rich!) There is no reason to believe that inflation or, for that matter, cost- 
of-living difference between Alaska and Alabama  affects all taxpayers 
“equally” so that equity measures are unaffected by these differences. In 
addition, to some extent taxpayers can choose to shift income over time, 
and certainly can choose to change their places of residence. For all these 
reasons and more, I would not place too much welfare significance on the 
equity indexes. I would treat them as yet another set of statistics describ- 
ing tax systems. 
Before turning to some specific comments let me raise one general con- 
ceptual issue: is it appropriate to  look only at the tax system’s treatment of 
identified or named individual returns in assessing its equity? Shouldn’t 
one characterize a tax system as satisfying a horizontal equity principle if 
it treats equals equally by randomly assigning tax rates? For instance, if 
there are one hundred individuals, all equal in some well-defined sense, 
and if the tax system assigns a random tax independently drawn from 
some distribution of tax rates to each of the one hundred individuals, it is 
indeed treating them equally, even though observed ranks of pre- and 
posttax incomes of any two individuals can be reversed by this process. 
More generally, is there an argument for applying Rawlsian concepts of 
justice rather than vertical and horizontal equity in some narrow sense in 
assessing tax systems? 
Some specific comments: 
Page 180. It is well known that the Gini coefficient is a rather insensitive 
measure of inequality. 
Page 182. Is it correct to draw an analogy from Arrow’s general possi- 
bility theorem and argue that if the domains of tax systems and pretax at- 
tributes are unrestricted, then it is impossible to define equity concepts 
that are applicable over the entire domain? 
Page 182. Are there any taxes other than lump-sum taxes that are purely 
distributive? Are there any purely allocative taxes? 
Which is the relevant measure of horizontal equity-the  policy analyst’s 
characterization of who are equal and who are not or the taxpayers’ per- 
ception of equality as it relates to themselves? 
Page 186 Proposition. By “cells of equals are singletons” do the authors 
mean that all members of a given cell have identical pretax incomes, while 
members of different cells have different incomes? 
Page 188. The arguments for introducing income difference and tax- 
rate-ratio weights in making paired comparisons are essentially ad hoc. 214  Marcus C. BerliantIRobert P. Strauss 
They do not seem to have any identifiable connection with the conceptual 
discussion in section 6.2.1. At least some sensitivity analysis with alterna- 
tive weighting schemes would be appropriate. 
Page 188. Since t is a tax rate, its unit is defined once one chooses to 
measure rates in proportions, percentages, mills, etc. As such, it does not 
make sense to require that scoring of comparisons be invariant with re- 
spect to scalar multiplication oft. 
Page 189. To the extent that one is attempting to draw welfare infer- 
ences from equity measures, the facts are bothersome that some incomes 
are excluded from the data and that the extent of such exclusion may de- 
pend on the levels of included income. 
Page 198. In respect of vertical equity measures, 1968 (and to  a lesser ex- 
tent, 1977) numbers seem to be out of line with those for other years. Is 
there any explanation? 
Page  196.  Since the  progressivity,  proportionality,  and  regressivity 
measures add to 1, if one of them (proportionality) is negligible, the other 
two by definition must be highly and negatively correlated. 
Page 199. For reasons of selectivity bias mentioned earlier, I will be 
more cautious in interpreting the results by filing type and filing strata (ex- 
cept perhaps by sex). 